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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-2(j) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the District Court's judgment, upon remittitur from the Utah Court 
of Appeals, awarding damages to plaintiff/appellee, Susan Slattery ("Slattery") for the value of 
certain securities in her account at defendant/appellant Covey & Co., Inc. ("Covey & Co.") and 
awarding Slattery attorney's fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue One: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings on the 
value of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. 
Standard of Review: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings 
on the value of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. is a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270, n.ll (Utah 
1993). 
Issue Two: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings on 
Slattery's appellate attorney's fees and costs. 
Standard of Review: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings 
on Slattery's attorney's fees and costs is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On July 7, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its opinion in Susan Slattery 
v. Covey & Co., Inc., Case No. 910570-CA ("Slattery I"). In its opinion in Slattery I, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, among other things, reversed that portion of the District Court's judgment 
granting Slattery an offset for the value of certain securities in her personal account at Covey & 
Co. and for credits for certain charges made to an account for Slattery at Covey & Co. designated 
as an "error account." The opinion also remanded the case to the trial court for entry of findings 
consistent with its opinion as to the reversal of the credits for the error account charges. 
2. On August 6, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a notice of remittitur in 
Slattery I. 
3. On August 18, 1993, counsel for Slattery noticed up a hearing on the issue of the 
value of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. 
4. On September 1, 1993, counsel for Slattery filed three motions seeking attorney's 
fees and costs. 
5. On September 2,1993, the district court convened a hearing. 
6. At the September 2, 1993 hearing, counsel for Covey & Co. objected to the court 
receiving any evidence on both of the issues of attorney's fees and costs and the value of 
securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. on the grounds that the district court's 
jurisdiction on remand was limited to the entry of findings as to Slattery's error account at Covey 
& Co. consistent with the opinion issued by the Utah Court of Appeals in Slattery I. (Transcript 
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of hearing conducted on September 2, 1993, pp. 5-14 [hereafter "Tr. pp. _"].) The district court 
overruled the objection and allowed counsel for Slattery to present evidence on the value of the 
securities and to present evidence on both attorney's fees and costs relating to Slattery I and 
attorney's fees relating to the hearing. (Tr. pp. 56-65.) The district court also addressed the issue 
of amending its previous findings regarding credits for charges to Slattery's error account to 
conform to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Slattery I. (Tr. pp. 66-67.) 
7. After the September 2, 1993 hearing, the district court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in which it found the value of securities remaining in Slattery's account at 
Covey & Co. to be $6,880 for shares of Future Time and $1,687.50 cents for shares of Bell 
Weather. 
8. On October 14, 1993 the district court issued a minute entry in which it awarded 
attorney's fees and costs related to Slattery I in the amount of $13,552.55, and also awarded 
attorney's fees related to the September 2, 1993 hearing in the amount of $1,937.50. 
9. On November 8, 1993, the district court entered judgment in favor of Slattery 
against Covey & Co. in the amount of $27,771.26, consisting of Slattery's adjusted error account 
credit balance of $3,713.71; the value of the securities remaining in Slattery's personal account at 
Covey & Co. in the amount of $8,567.50; attorney's fees related to the September 2, 1993 
hearing in the amount of $1,937.50 and attorney's fees and costs relating to Slattery I in the 
amount of $13,552.55. 
10. On December 8,1993 Covey & Co. filed a notice of appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The opinion rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals in Slattery I reversed two aspects of 
the district court's findings and judgment and remanded the case to the district court for entry of 
findings consistent with its opinion as to Slattery's error account. Upon remand, the district court 
had jurisdiction only to amend its findings relating to the two charges to Slattery's error account 
at Covey & Co. which were found to have been inappropriate. Despite its limited jurisdiction in 
this matter, the district court, over the objection of counsel for Covey & Co., heard evidence on 
the value of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. and also heard 
evidence with respect to attorney's fees and costs related to Slattery I and related to the hearing. 
The district court erred in overruling Covey & Co.'s objection to an evidentiary hearing 
on the value of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co., and on attorney's fees 
and costs. These issues were clearly outside of the district court's jurisdiction on remand and 
contrary to the mandate of this Court in Slattery I. The judgment entered by the district court for 
the value of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. ($8,567.50) and for 
attorney's fees and costs ($15,490.05) should therefore be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS ON THE VALUE OF CERTAIN 
SECURITIES IN SLATTERY'S PERSONAL ACCOUNT AT 
COVEY & CO. 
In Slattery I, Covey & Co. claimed that the district court erred in its findings of fact as to 
the valuation of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. and asserted that 
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the evidence was insufficient to support that valuation. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed. In its 
opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals noted Slattery's testimony at trial that she only kept track of 
the value of the stocks in her account "from time to time," that the value of her Future Time 
shares was $360; and that the value of her Bell Weather shares was "approximately $1,400, 
maybe $1,500." The opinion further observed that after trial, Slattery submitted an affidavit 
which set forth numbers of shares and value that differed from her trial testimony. Slattery v. 
Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah App. 1993). The Court found that the affidavit was 
not a sufficient basis for the value of the stocks because it did not establish an objective basis or 
foundation for the valuation nor did it explain the conflict with Slattery's trial testimony. (Id. at 
249.) Therefore, the Court held that Slattery was not entitled to judgment for the $6,847.50 
offset. (Id. at 249.) 
The foregoing portion of the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Slattery I was final and 
unequivocal. The Court simply reversed the district court on this issue, and asked the district 
court to do nothing further with respect thereto. This mandate gave no discretion to the district 
court to deal in any manner with the value of the securities in Slattery's personal account at 
Covey & Co. on remand to the district court. 
When an appellate court issues a notice of remittitur remanding a case to the trial court, 
the trial court only has jurisdiction to implement the mandate of the Court of Appeals. If the trial 
court does anything more than implement that mandate, it exceeds its jurisdiction. 
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In Bryfogle v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 739 P.2d 819 (Ariz. App. 1987) the appellee, 
Bryfogle, was discharged from his position with the appellant, the Arizona Department of 
Corrections. After an administrative hearing, the dismissal was adopted by the Arizona State 
Personnel Board. Bryfogle appealed to the superior court and received a ruling in his favor. The 
Arizona Dept. of Corrections then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Arizona. The Court of 
Appeals of Arizona reversed the superior court's decision and reinstated Bryfogle's dismissal. 
After an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration and the denial of a petition for review in the 
Arizona Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals of Arizona issued the mandate to the superior 
court ordering the superior court to comply with its decision. In the meantime, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 
1487 (1985). Bryfogle then filed petitions for permission to file motions for reconsideration with 
the Arizona Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Arizona seeking a ruling on the 
applicability of LoudermilL Bryfogle's petitions were denied by the Arizona Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals of Arizona. Thereafter, Bryfogle moved the superior court to modify the 
mandate of the Court of Appeals of Arizona to comport with LoudermilL The superior court 
granted the motion entering judgment in favor of Bryfogle. In doing so, the superior court found 
that it had jurisdiction, and that the denial by the Arizona Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals of Arizona of permission to file motions for reconsideration was not a disposition on the 
merits of the matters raised in the petitions. Both parties framed the issue on appeal as whether 
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the superior court had jurisdiction to supersede the mandate issued by the Court of Appeals of 
Arizona. 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that the superior court had exceeded its 
jurisdiction and reversed the decision of the superior court. In doing so, the court stated: "Where 
a mandate has issued giving a trial court specific directions, the trial court is generally not free to 
deviate from the mandate. Tovrea v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 295, 419 P.2d 79 (1966)." 
Bryfogle, supra at p. 821. The Court of Appeals of Arizona stated that: "All that remained was 
for the trial court .to reverse its original judgment . . . ." Bryfogle, supra at p. 821. (See also 
Amax Magnesium v. State Tax Com'n. 848 P.2d 715, 717-18 (Utah App. 1993), reversed on other 
grounds, Amax Magnesium v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 874 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994); Carrillo v. 
State, 817 P.2d 493, 499 (Ariz. App. 1991); and Cerminara v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 765 
P.2d 182 (Nev. 1988). 
Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or 
judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court 
may order the trial court or agency to supplement, modify, or complete the 
findings to make them conform to the issues presented and the facts as found from 
the evidence and may direct the trial court or agency to enter judgment in 
accordance with the findings as revised. The court may also order a new trial or 
further proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass 
upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the 
appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case. 
This provision further supports the proposition that the trial court cannot operate outside the 
specific mandate of the opinion rendered by an appellate court. 
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The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court on 
remand in Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948). In that case, the 
trial court had tried issues relating to whether or not a partnership existed between plaintiff and 
defendant; whether or not that partnership had been terminated, and if so, when; whether or not 
one of the defendants was a proper party to the action; and certain procedural questions which 
were not relevant to the appeal. During the trial of the case, evidence as to partnership profits or 
related matters was excluded until a determination was first made as to whether or not defendant 
was entitled to any relief against plaintiffs. The decision of the trial court was the subject of an 
interlocutory appeal and therefore the only issues before the court were those that had been 
litigated by the parties in the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial 
court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court permitted 
defendant to amend his complaint to demand an accounting on the basis of reasonable rental 
value of the partnership property. The plaintiffs objected to defendant being allowed to 
introduce the new issue of accounting on a rental basis into the case. Plaintiffs took the position 
that defendant should only be able to seek an accounting from plaintiffs on a profit basis, which 
was defendant's position prior to the interlocutory appeal. 
The Supreme Court stated the rule as follows: 
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is affirmed or reversed and 
remanded with directions to enter a particular judgment, the trial court may not 
permit amended or supplemental proceedings to be framed to try rights already 
settled. 9 Bancroft, op. cit., Sec. 7430. This rule is not only reasonable, but 
necessary, if litigation is ever to come to an end. After an appellate court has once 
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ruled upon issues presented to it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and the 
trial court is bound to follow it, even though it considers the ruling erroneous. 
Street, supra. 191 P.2dat 158. 
The Utah Supreme Court also made the following statement: "But where the entire case 
is not settled by the appellate tribunal where certain issues are left open by its judgment or 
decree, the trial court ordinarily has discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as 
to those matters which have been left open." Street, supra 91 P.2d at 1158. {See also Call v. 
City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1986).) 
In Slattery I, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. 
The remand was for the sole purpose of correcting the findings of fact to eliminate credits given 
to Slattery by the district court for charges to her error account at Covey & Co. The Utah Court 
of Appeals did not order a new trial or order further proceedings to be conducted as to the value 
of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. The district court had no jurisdiction 
outside of the mandate. There was simply no authority for the district court to conduct further 
proceedings on this issue. Therefore, the district court's judgment for $8,567.50 for the value of 
securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. should be reversed. 
II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS ON SLATTERY'S APPELLATE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
In Slattery I, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the issue of attorney's fees. At 
footnote 4, the Court stated, "Slattery also seeks attorney's fees on appeal, based on the 
employment contract. However, she was not awarded attorney fees at trial and did not appeal 
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from that determination. Because Slattery does not present any argument to support her request 
for fees on appeal, we decline to address the issue." Slattery, 857 P.2d at 249. 
The foregoing language simply cannot be construed as a remand of the attorney's fees 
issue to the district court. Had the Court determined that an award of attorney's fees and costs to 
Slattery was appropriate, it would have instructed the district court to determine the proper 
amount of attorney's fees on remand and Rule 34(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
would have become applicable with respect to costs. Instead, the Court declined to address the 
issue due to Slattery's failure to present any supporting argument. The only way that Slattery 
could have properly addressed the issue of appellate attorney's fees and costs was in a motion to 
the Utah Court of Appeals itself. 
In Vinton Eppsco, Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, Inc., 638 P.2d 1070 (N.M. 
1981), appellant Eppsco had sued appellee Showe and William Coady for non-payment for 
plumbing materials. Eppsco obtained judgment against Coady and executed a writ of 
garnishment on Showe. The Valencia County District Court dissolved the writ of garnishment 
and awarded Showe attorney's fees pursuant to a provision of the New Mexico statutes. On 
appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the county district court's action and issued a 
mandate remanding the cause to the county district court for further proceedings consistent with 
the memorandum of opinion. In its appeal, Showe had urged the court to remand to the trial 
court for an assessment of appellate attorney's fees and the New Mexico Supreme Court had 
made no mention of a remand for that purpose in its mandate. 
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On the second appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the county district court 
had exceeded its mandate on remand and therefore was without jurisdiction to award appellate 
attorney's fees. The Court stated: 
The district courts have only such jurisdiction on remand as the opinion and 
mandate of an appellate court specifies. Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 57, 
582 P.2d 1270 (1978). It is well settled that the duty of a lower court on remand 
is to comply with the mandate of the appellate court, and to obey the directions 
therein without variation, even though the mandate may be erroneous. Glaser v. 
Dannelley, 26 N.M. 371, 193 P.76 (1920). 
Eppsco, supra, at p. 1071. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court further stated that "[a]ppellate courts have authority to 
either make an allowance of attorney fees on appeal or to remand to the lower court for that 
purpose. Coons v. Coons, 6 Wash. App. 123, 491 P.2d 1333 (1971)." Eppsco, supra, at p. 1071. 
However, the court noted that it had considered Showe's request to remand the case to the county 
district court for an assessment of appellate attorney's fees and decided against remanding for 
that purpose. 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Slattery I was to decline to address the issue 
of attorney's fees. The mandate to the district court therefore denied it jurisdiction with respect 
to appellate attorney's fees. Based on its lack of jurisdiction to address the issue, the district 
court's award of appellate attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $13,552.55 should be 
reversed. 
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Because the Utah Court of Appeals' remand of Slattery I for amendment of the findings 
of fact to conform with the opinion did not leave open issues regarding the value of securities in 
Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co., or appellate attorney's fees incurred by Slattery, the 
hearing at which these issues were addressed was entirely outside the district court's jurisdiction 
and unnecessary. Therefore, the district court's award of attorney's fees in the amount of 
$1,937.50 in connection with that hearing should also be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the district court's judgment for the value of securities in 
Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. in the amount of $8,567.50 and attorney's fees and 
costs in the amount of $15,490.05 should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this 17 day of January, 1995. 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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